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Abstract 
This study investigates government quality determinants of ICT adoption using Generalised 
Method of Moments on a panel of 49 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries for the period 
2000-2012. ICT is measured with mobile phone penetration, internet penetration and 
telephone penetration rates while all governance dimensions from the World Bank 
Governance Indicators are considered, namely: political governance (consisting of political 
stability and “voice & accountability”); economic governance (entailing government 
effectiveness and regulation  quality) and institutional governance (encompassing the rule of 
law and corruption-control). The following findings are established. First, political stability 
and the rule of law have positive short run and negative long term effects on mobile phone 
penetration. Second, the rule of law has a positive (negative) short run (long term) effect on 
internet penetration. Third, government effectiveness and corruption-control have positive 
short run and long term effects on telephone penetration. Institutional governance appears to 
be most significant in determining ICT adoption in SSA. 
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1. Introduction 
  Three main motivations underline the positioning of this study, namely: the growing 
role of information and communication technology (ICT) in development outcomes as well as 
the comparatively better potential for its penetration in Africa and (ii) the role of governance 
in innovation and ICT and (iii) gaps in the literature. The highlighted motivations are 
substantiated in chronological order.  
 First, compared to other regions of the world (e.g. Europe, Asia and North America), 
there is comparatively more room for ICT penetration in Africa (see Penard et al., 2012; 
Asongu, 2015a). According to the narrative, compared to Africa, high-end markets (or 
markets in developed countries) have reached saturation points in internet and mobile phone 
penetrations whereas; corresponding penetration rates in Africa are low. ICT has been 
documented to be associated with a plethora of development outcomes, inter alia: 
advancement of financial inclusion (Kirui et al., 2013; Singh, 2012); empowerment of the 
female gender (Maurer, 2008; Ojo et al., 2012); amelioration of health services for those in 
the low income strata (Kliner et al., 2013); reduction of the gap between urban and rural areas 
(Chan & Jia, 2011; Qiang et al., 2011); elimination of wastes in agriculture via reduction in 
demand- and supply-side constraints as well as well demand and supply mismatches (Muto & 
Yamano, 2009; Aker & Fafchamps, 2010);  household management efficiency (Al Surikhi, 
2012; Asongu, 2015b) and consolidation of business avenues  (Ondiege, 2010, p. 11; Mishra 
& Bisht, 2013, p. 505). 
 The relevance of ICT in inclusive development is timely because a World Bank report 
on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) extreme poverty target 
revealed that extreme poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the 
exception of Africa, where about 45% of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) were 
substantially off-track from achieving the MDG extreme poverty target (World Bank, 2015; 
Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017). This puzzling statistics is against the backdrop of a 
continent that has been enjoying more than two decades of growth resurgence which began 
the mid 1990s (Fosu, 2015a, p. 44). Furthermore, the role of governance in mobile phones for 
inclusive development has been recently established in SSA (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a).  
 Second, the quality of institutions has been documented to be very crucial in driving 
non-exclusive growth in Africa and explaining the recent poverty tragedy of the continent (see 
Fosu, 2015b, 2015c; Kuada, 2015). Furthermore, good governance has been established to be 
associated with more non-exclusive growth, notably, in: consolidating the foundations of 
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societal change (Efobi, 2015) and improving standards of living via better management of 
economic resources (Fosu, 2013; Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014; Fonchingong, 2014).     
 Unfortunately, despite the well established connections between ICT and inclusive 
development on the one hand and on the other hand, good institutions and non-exclusive 
development, most of the literature on the connection between ICT and governance in Africa 
has been focused on the influence of ICT on the quality of government
1
.  
 To put the above point into greater perspective, the predominant African literature on 
causality flowing from ICT to governance  include, inter alia: (i) Snow (2009) who has 
established a negative nexus between a country’s mobile phone penetration rate and her 
perceived corruption level; (ii) Mathias (2012) who has documented the growing role of ICT 
on accountability in the continent; (iv) Gagliardone (2016) has engaged the role of mobile-
radio interactions on the quality of government in Africa to conclude that government 
corrective and preventive measures are ameliorated by underlying interactions in Kenya; (v) 
Porter et al. (2015) have  focused on Ghana, Malawi and South Africa to establish that the 
growing relevance of mobile usage in Africa by the youth population  can be tailored to 
achieve greater consistency between policy and practice and (vi) Asongu and Nwachukwu 
(2016b) have investigated how the mobile phone in the diffusion of knowledge affects 
institutional quality in SSA.  
 Noticeably, the above literature leaves room for improvement in two main areas: 
investigation of the role of governance in ICT penetration on the one hand and on the other 
hand, time-dynamic effects of such linkages. The interest of investigating both short-term and 
long-run effects is to increase room for policy implication.  Overall, the policy relevance of 
the inquiry builds on the need to understand how governance dynamics affect the rate of ICT 
penetration. To this end, we aim to assess how political governance (political stability and 
“voice & accountability”), economic governance (government effectiveness and regulation 
quality) and institutional governance (the rule of law and corruption-control) affect ICT 
adoption. Three ICT (mobile phone, internet and telephone penetration) variables are 
considered because Penard et al. (2012) have recently concluded that some types of ICT (e.g. 
internet penetration versus mobile phone penetration) are significantly more adopted than 
others in the continent. In the light of above narratives, this paper seeks to answer the 
following question: how does governance affect ICT adoption in the short run and long term? 
                                                          
1
 Much has been documented on the nexus between ICT and governance (Suarez, 2006; Kiessling, 2007; Billon 
et al., 2009; Boulianne, 2009; Diamond, 2010; Grossman et al., 2014; Andrés et al., 2017), especially on the 
relevance of ICT in boosting collective action (Breuer et al., 2012; Pierskalla  & Hollenbach, 2013; Weidmann 
& Shapiro, 2015; Manacorda & Tesei, 2016). 
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 The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 clarifies the concepts of 
governance and engages the relevant literature. The data and methodology are covered in 
Section 3 while Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 covers concluding implications with 
future research directions.   
 
2. Clarification of governance concepts and theoretical highlights  
 We engage this section in four main categories, namely: (i) clarification of concepts of 
governance, (ii) conflicting positions in the appreciation of governance, (iii) empirical 
relevance of adopted governance concepts and (iv) conception of ICT-governance.  In the first 
category, according to Asongu (2016), a plethora of definitions have been provided to elicit 
the concept of governance in recent literature.  
 In the first category, for the purpose of brevity, four main definitions of governance 
are discussed. (1) In accordance with Dixit (2009), economic governance is the  “…structure 
and functioning of the legal and social institutions that support economic activity and 
economic transactions by protecting property rights, enforcing contracts, and taking 
collective action to provide physical and organizational infrastructure”2 (p.5). (2) 
Governance in the perspective of Tusalem (2015) is a phenomenon that entails: corruption, 
the rule of law, bureaucratic effectiveness and regulatory quality. (3) With respect to 
Fukuyama (2013), the term governance can be consolidated through the adoption of four 
principal avenues that are essential to the understanding of “state quality”, namely: political 
indicators, output measures and capacity variables which are made-up of professionalism and 
resources.   (4) To the best of our knowledge, the most widely employed governance 
indicators are those of Kaufmann et al. (2010), which Andrés et al. (2015) have classified into 
three principal frameworks: (i) “political governance” which is understood as the election and 
replacement of political leaders (proxied with “voice & accountability” and political 
stability/no-violence); (ii) economic governance (measured with government effectiveness 
and regulation quality) is the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public 
commodities and (iii) institutional governance (proxied with corruption-control and the rule of 
law) which is the respect by the State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions 
between them.  
 The second category of the discourse relates to concerns that have arisen in scholarly 
circles on the quality of governance indicators from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi. One of 
the most interesting debates has been with Andrew Schrank and Marcus Kurtz. The debates 
                                                          
2
 Emphasis on original.  
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can be summarised into four main narratives, namely: models, measures and mechanisms; a 
reply; a defense and a rejoinder. (1) In “models, measures and mechanisms”, Kurtz and 
Schrank (2007a) have questioned the wide popularity enjoyed by the indictors from 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi. Their argument fundamentally questions the positive 
causality flowing from governance to economic development. In essence, they have disputed 
that the confidence enjoyed by the underlying indicators is exaggerated because the indicators 
are potentially problematic given that they are characteristic of a plethora of concerns such as: 
sample adverse selection, conceptual conflation and perceptual biases.   
(2) In response to the criticisms, counter arguments have been presented by Kaufmann et al. 
(2007a). They provide three arguments to dispel the criticisms. (i) They first demonstrate that 
the claims levelled at them on governance “perception-based measurement biases” are 
falsifiable, speculative and fail to withstand empirical consensus. (ii) The authors also provide 
empirical support to substantiate their rebuttals by further arguing that the short term 
relationship between growth and governance claim by their scholarly opponents is flawed 
from a conceptual perspective. (iii) Lastly, they dismiss some empirical studies used by the 
contending authors to substantiate the opposing perspective on the nature of the relationship 
between governance and growth.  
(3) In defense of their previous standpoint, Kurtz and Schrank (2007b) respond to Kaufmann 
et al. (2007a) by articulating that their previous stance with concerns of opaqueness in the 
conception and measurement fundamentally builds on the conflicting scholarly literature 
surrounding directions of causality between governance and growth.  
(4) In a rejoinder, Kaufmann et al. (2007b) reiterate that the criticisms from the contending 
authors are baseless and lack substance partly because the concerns of  “potential respondent 
bias” raised by their scholarly opponents are not exclusively restricted to government 
effectiveness, but are also apparent in other variables.  
 In the third category, indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2007a, 2007b, 2010) are 
adopted in this inquiry because as far as we have reviewed, they are the most predominantly 
employed in the literature. Consistent with the motivation of the study, in order to provide 
more room for policy implications, all six governance indicators are employed. The interest of 
employing all governance indicators is in accordance with an evolving stream of African 
governance literature:  the role of governance in knowledge economy (Andrés et al., 2015); 
revolution empirics in the prediction of the recent Arab Spring (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2016c); governance channels in the battle against conflicts/crimes (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 
2016) and software piracy (Andrés & Asongu, 2013) and; the most effective governance 
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determinants of innovation (Oluwatobi et al., 2015). Studies in the literature that are closest to 
the presenting study are Asongu (2016); Andrés et al. (2015), Andrés and Asongu (2013) and 
Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2016). These studies have used six governance indicators to 
assess how governance affects: conflicts and crimes (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2016); 
economic growth (Asongu, 2016); knowledge economy (Andrés et al., 2015) and software 
piracy (Andrés & Asongu, 2013).  
 It is important to clarify the concept of ICT-governance in the fourth category. 
According to Hellstrom (2008), the relationship can be defined as the use of ICT to ameliorate 
the benefits of governance. We argue that such a relationship is not a one-way traffic because 
governance standards also determine ICT adoption. For instance electronic (e)-governance is 
very likely to affect ICT penetration. In essence, once governance initiatives favouring e-
governance are in place, it is very likely that all parties in e-governance (citizens, government 
units and businesses) contribute in one way or another towards enhancing ICT penetration.   
 In the light of the above underpinnings, governance can be employed to improve 
transparency. In essence, openness and policies designed to improve the free circulation of 
information is determined to a large extent by governance. For instance some policies by a 
government to facilitate ICT adoption may include:  (i) the free circulation of information 
between the government agencies and citizens and (ii) direct citizenry participation in 
government. In summary, governance can influence how ICT brings societies together with 
more connection, participation, information and innovation.  
 The positioning of the study steers clear of recent literature which has fundamentally 
focused on the relevance of ICT in influencing governance. While a strand maintains that 
information decentralisation through ICT mitigates opportunities for governance (Suarez, 
2006; Boulianne, 2009; Diamond, 2010; Grossman et al., 2014), another strand posits that 
ICT may offer opportunities for poor governance because it facilitates violent collective 
action (Breuer et al., 2012; Pierskalla  & Hollenbach, 2013; Weidmann & Shapiro, 2015; 
Manacorda & Tesei, 2016 ) and reduces the quality of governance (Morozov, 2011). From an 
African specific perspective, the four main studies on the effect of ICT on governance have 
been discussed in the introduction. This study steers clear of the engaged literature by 
assessing how government quality affects ICT adoption.  
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3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
This paper assesses a panel of forty-nine countries in Sub-Saharan African with data from 
World Governance Indicators and African Development Indicators of the World Bank for the 
period 2000-2012. In accordance with the recent African knowledge economy literature 
(Tchamyou, 2016), three ICT-related dependent variables are used, namely: mobile phone 
penetration (per 100 people), internet penetration (per 100 people) and telephone penetration 
(per 100 people).  
 Consistent with the narrative in Section 2, six good governance indicators from 
Kaufmann et al. (2010) are employed. These are indicators of: (i) political governance 
(political stability/non violence and “voice & accountability”); (ii) economic governance 
(government effectiveness and regulation quality) and (iii) institutional governance 
(corruption-control and the rule of law).   
  Five control variables are used to account for variable omission bias, namely: the 
lagged ICT indicator, economic growth, trade openness, population growth and primary 
school enrolment. The lagged ICT indicator is used to control for persistence in ICT. The 
other four indicators are intuitively expected to boost ICT penetration. First, economic 
prosperity in terms of economic growth is logically expected to be positively linked to ICT 
penetration because some of the income distributed (accruing from economic growth) at the 
microeconomic level increases the ICT purchasing power of household and corporate users. 
Second, trade openness involves more exchanges in goods and services which is partially 
enhanced by ICT availability. Hence, ICT can both be a cause and a consequence of more 
exchange in commodities. Third, it is very likely that ICT adoption increases with a growing 
population because the potential for penetration increases concurrently. This is essentially 
because ICT penetration is defined and measured as a proportion of people. Fourth, primary 
school enrolment should be positively linked to ICT for two main reasons: (i) a minimum 
level of literacy is required to use the ICT proxies employed in this study and (ii) compared to 
other academic levels, higher development externalities are expected from primary schooling 
when economies are still at the early stages of industrialisation (see Petrakis & Stamatakis, 
2002; Asiedu, 2014). 
After a preliminary assessment, control for more than five indicators leads to post-
estimation instrument proliferation which negatively affects the validity of estimation models. 
The full definitions of variables are provided in Appendix 1, while Appendix 2 discloses the 
summary statistics. The correlation matrix is presented in Appendix 3.   
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3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Specification  
 This paper employs the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with forward 
orthogonal deviations (Roodman, 2009a, 2009b). Five main reasons motivate the choice of 
the estimation technique. Whereas the first-two are basic requirements for the approach, the 
last-three are advantages related to the empirical strategy. First, the N(49)>T(13) condition for 
the application of the technique is met because the number of cross sections is higher than the 
corresponding number of time series in each cross section. Second, the requirement of 
persistence in the dependent variable is also met because the correlation between the ICT 
variables and their corresponding first lag is higher than the rule of thumb threshold of 0.800. 
In essence, the underlying correlations for mobile phone penetration, internet penetration and 
telephone penetration are respectively, 0.987, 0.987 and 0.996. Third, cross-country 
differences are not eliminated in the estimation strategy. Fourth, the strategy accounts for 
potential endogeneity in all regressors by using: (i) instrumented regressors to control for 
simultaneity and (ii) time invariant omitted variables to control for the unobserved 
hetereogeneity. Fifth, small sample biases in the difference estimator are mitigated with the 
system estimator. It is for this last motive that there is a strong consensus in the literature (see 
Bond et al., 2001; Asongu, 2013b) that the system GMM estimator (from Arellano & Bover, 
1995; Blundell & Bond, 2001) should be adopted in place of the difference estimator 
(Arellano & Bond, 1991).  
 Within the framework of this study, a   Roodman (2009, 2009b) extension of Arellano 
and Bover (1995) is adopted because it has been documented to limit the proliferation of 
instruments and restrict over-identification (see Baltagi  et al., 2008; Love  & Zicchino, 2006;   
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b).  In the specification, a two-step approach is adopted in 
preference of the one-step procedure because the former (latter) is consistent with 
heteroscedasticity (homoscedasticity).   
The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarize the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure:  
 tititih
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where, tiICT ,  
is information and communication technology (mobile phone, internet and 
telephone penetrations) for country i
 
at  period t ; 0 is a constant; 
G , governance (political, 
economic and institutional) and W  is the vector of control variables  (GDP growth, trade 
openness, population growth  and primary school enrolment);
 
 represents the coefficient of 
serial correlation, t  
is the time-specific constant,
 i

 
is the country-specific effect and ti ,  the 
error term.  
  
3.2.2 Identification, simultaneity and exclusion restrictions  
 
It is important to engage identification and exclusion restrictions because they are vital 
for the tight specification of GMM models. In accordance with recent literature (see Asongu 
& De Moor, 2017; Dewan & Ramaprasad, 2014), all independent variables are considered as 
suspected endogenous or pre-determined variables and the gmmstyle is employed for them. 
Conversely only “years” (or time-invariant omitted variables) are treated as strictly exogenous 
and the procedure for treating the ivstyle (years) is “iv(years, eq(diff))” because it is not likely 
for the years to become endogenous in first-difference (see Roodman, 2009b).  
The issue of simultaneity is tackled using the lagged regressors as instrumental 
variables for forward-differenced indicators. Accordingly, in order to purge fixed effects that 
could eventually affect the investigated linkages, Helmet transformations are used in 
accordance with Love and Zicchino (2006) and Arellano and Bover (1995). These 
transformations encompass forward mean variations of the indicator. In other words, the mean 
values of all potential observations are deducted from the indicators, as opposed to subtracting 
the previous observation for the present ones. Such transformations enable orthogonal or 
parallel conditions between lagged observations and forward differenced values. Regardless 
of the number of lags, the suggested transformations are computed for all observations, with 
the exception of the last for each cross section. The purpose of engaging all observations is to 
limit data loss. “And because lagged observations do not enter the formula, they are valid as 
instruments” (see Roodman, 2009b, p. 104; Asongu & De Moor, 2017). 
Concerning the exclusion restriction, we argue that the strictly exogenous instruments 
affect the outcome variable exclusively via the endogenous explaining variables. Moreover, 
the statistical relevance of the exclusion restriction is assessed with the Difference in Hansen 
Test (DHT) for the exogeneity of instruments. In essence, the null hypothesis of the test 
should not be rejected for the strictly exogenous instruments to elucidate the ICT dependent 
variables exclusively through the suspected endogenous or predetermined variables. 
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Moreover, while in the standard GMM procedure, the validity of the instruments is confirmed 
when the null hypothesis of the Sargan Overidentifying restriction test is not rejected (see 
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016d), in the GMM with forward orthogonal deviations, the DHT is 
employed to investigate if the time-invariant omitted variables (adopted as strictly exogenous) 
affect the outcome variable exclusively via the proposed channels. Hence in the findings that 
are reported in the section below, the validity of instruments is confirmed if the alternative 
hypotheses of the DHT corresponding to IV (year, eq(diff)) is not accepted.  
 
 
4. Empirical results 
Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 respectively, present findings corresponding to regressions on 
mobile phone penetration, internet penetration and telephone penetration. Four principal 
information criteria are employed to examine the validity of the GMM model with forward 
orthogonal deviations (see Asongu & De Moor, 2017, p. 200). First, the null hypothesis 
corresponding to the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in 
difference should not be rejected. This is essentially because it is the position for an absence 
of autocorrelation in the residuals. In addition, we exclusively report the second-order 
Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) because when compared with the 
corresponding first-order test, it is more relevant in ascertaining the absence of 
autocorrelation. Accordingly, some studies exclusively report the higher-order test with no 
disclosure of the first-order test (Narayan et al., 2011; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c).  
Second, the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not be 
rejected because their null hypotheses argue for the position that instruments are valid or not 
correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not 
weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to 
restrict the proliferation of instruments or limit identification, in specifications, the number of 
cross-sections should be higher than the corresponding number of instruments. A means of 
addressing the underlying conflict is to adopt the Hansen test and avoid the proliferation of 
instruments as much as possible. Such instrument proliferation is avoided in this study by 
ensuring that the number of instruments in each specification is lower than the corresponding 
number of cross sections. 
Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for the exogeneity of instruments is also 
employed to investigate exclusive restrictions emphasised in the identification strategy and 
12 
 
hence the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fisher test for the joint 
validity of estimated coefficients is also provided.  
  Where estimated coefficients corresponding to the governance indicators are 
significant, the long-term effects are computed.  For example in the second column of Table 
1, the short term effect of political stability is 2.600 whereas the corresponding long run 
impact is -37.142 (2.600/ [1-1.070]), where 1.070  corresponds to the estimated lagged value 
of mobile phone penetration.   
 The following findings can be established. In Table 1 on the relationship between 
governance and mobile phone penetration, political stability and the rule of law have positive 
short-term and negative long run effects on mobile phone penetration. The effects from 
corruption-control, government effectiveness, voice & accountability and regulation quality 
are not significant. In Table 2 on the linkages between governance and internet penetration, 
only the rule of law has a significant effect on internet penetration. Its short term effect is 
positive while its corresponding long term influence is negative. The impacts from corruption-
control, government effectiveness, voice & accountability and regulation quality and political 
stability are not significant. Table 3 provides findings on the connection between governance 
and telephone penetration. We notice that the short term effects of government effectiveness 
and corruption-control on telephone penetration are positive while the corresponding long run 
impacts are also positive. The effects from political stability, voice & accountability, 
regulation quality and the rule of law are not significant. Most of the significant control 
variables have the expected signs.   
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Table 1: Mobile Phone Penetration and Governance  
       
 Dependent Variable: Mobile Phone Penetration 
       
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
 Political Stability Voice  & Regulation Government Rule of Law Corruption 
 /Non  Violence Accountability Quality Effectiveness  Control 
       
Constant  -2.493 -2.539 -4.041 -5.509 -1.446 -6.470* 
 (0.514) (0.568) (0.215) (0.275) (0.733) (0.072) 
Mobile Phone  (-1) 1.070*** 1.083*** 1.069*** 1.096*** 1.097*** 1.082*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Stability  2.600** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.013)      
Voice & Accountability  --- 1.056 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.407)     
Regulation Quality  --- --- 1.705 --- --- --- 
   (0.159)    
Government Effectiveness  --- --- --- 0.476 --- --- 
    (0.790)   
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- 2.935* --- 
     (0.070)  
Corruption Control  --- --- --- --- --- 0.259 
      (0.851) 
Economic Growth  0.010 -0.014 -0.004 0.012 0.011 -0.004 
 (0.731) (0.701) (0.908) (0.748) (0.776) (0.900) 
Trade Openness  -0.010 0.0007 0.0007 0.001 -0.010 0.003 
 (0.458) (0.961) (0.960) (0.898) (0.449) (0.791) 
Population Growth  1.665*** 0.999* 0.926 1.099** 1.380** 1.058** 
 (0.005) (0.078) (0.113) (0.034) (0.015) (0.031) 
Primary School Enrolment  0.045* 0.041 0.036 0.055 0.037 0.069** 
 (0.079) (0.229) (0.272) (0.166) (0.289) (0.037) 
       
Long Term Effects  -37.142 na na na -30.257 na 
       
AR(1) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
AR(2) (0.927) (0.891) (0.896) (0.816) (0.804) (0.910) 
Sargan OIR (0.005) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Hansen OIR (0.289) (0.298) (0.210) (0.306) (0.169) (0.405) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.411) (0.105) (0.078) (0.159) (0.041) (0.142) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.258) (0.591) (0.501) (0.499) (0.563) (0.675) 
(b) IV (years, eq (diff))       
H excluding group (0.270) (0.284) (0.786) (0.564) (0.718) (0.489) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.363) (0.361) (0.061) (0.186) (0.053) (0.330) 
Fisher  2816.90*** 2476.85*** 4390.54*** 2718.05*** 2102.23*** 3111.34*** 
Instruments  32 32 32 32 32 32 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  376 376 376 376 376 376 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of 
the instruments in the Sargan  and Hansen OIR tests. na: not applicable because at least one estimate required for the computation of long run 
effects is not significant.  
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Table 2: Internet Penetration and Governance  
       
 Dependent Variable: Internet Penetration 
       
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
 Political Stability Voice  & Regulation Government Rule of Law Corruption 
 /Non  Violence Accountability Quality Effectiveness  Control 
       
Constant  2.193*** 1.908** 1.021 -0.090 2.674** 1.027 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.204) (0.932) (0.013) (0.129) 
Internet Penetration  (-1) 1.120 1.1.30*** 1.136*** 1.140*** 1.097*** 1.121*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Stability  0.213 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.442)      
Voice & Accountability  --- 0.041 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.856)     
Regulation Quality  --- --- -0.560 --- --- --- 
   (0.167)    
Government Effectiveness  --- --- --- -0.338 --- --- 
    (0.195)   
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- 1.166** --- 
     (0.010)  
Corruption Control  --- --- --- --- --- 0.322 
      (0.241) 
Economic Growth  -0.017** -0.017** -0.004 -0.012 -0.019*** -0.015** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.538) (0.103) (0.002) (0.025) 
Trade Openness  -0.003 -0.0005 0.0002 0.0003 0.001 0.0007 
 (0.342) (0.851) (0.921) (0.899) (0.725) (0.759) 
Population Growth  -0.284** -0.348*** -0.489*** -0.251** -0.190 -0.240** 
 (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.102) (0.010) 
Primary School Enrolment  -0.010* -0.008 -0.002 0.003 -0.009 -0.002 
 (0.065) (0.151) (0.684) (0.624) (0.167) (0.618) 
       
Long Term Effects  na na na na -12.020 na 
       
AR(1) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.028) 
AR(2) (0.910) (0.881) (0.857) (0.909) (0.812) (0.917) 
Sargan OIR (0.012) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) 
Hansen OIR (0.098) (0.127) (0.245) (0.265) (0.105) (0.285) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.822) (0.878) (0.619) (0.670) (0.736) (0.897) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.029) (0.036) (0.143) (0.146) (0.038) (0.106) 
(b) IV (years, eq (diff))       
H excluding group (0.593) (0.490) (0.457) (0.409) (0.527) (0.307) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.034) (0.065) (0.175) (0.221) (0.045) (0.319) 
Fisher  5166.21*** 10144.44*** 10549.72*** 8257.88*** 3339.02*** 11656.65*** 
Instruments  32 32 32 32 32 32 
Countries  44 44 44 44 44 44 
Observations  369 369 369 369 369 369 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of 
the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. na: not applicable because at least one estimate required for the computation of long run 
effects is not significant.  
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Table 3: Telephone Penetration and Governance  
       
 Dependent Variable: Telephone Penetration 
       
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
 Political Stability Voice  & Regulation Government Rule of Law Corruption 
 /Non  Violence Accountability Quality Effectiveness  Control 
       
Constant  1.614** 1.937*** 2.244*** 2.295*** 2.021** 1.888** 
 (0.031) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.011) (0.022) 
Telephone Penetration  (-1) 0.964*** 0.948*** 0.954*** 0.906*** 0.936*** 0.880*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Stability  0.067 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.657)      
Voice & Accountability  --- 0.209 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.144)     
Regulation Quality  --- --- 0.326 --- --- --- 
   (0.130)    
Government Effectiveness  --- --- --- 0.670** --- --- 
    (0.015)   
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- 0.281 --- 
     (0.224)  
Corruption Control  --- --- --- --- --- 0.483** 
      (0.043) 
Economic Growth  0.010** 0.007* 0.009* 0.007 0.008* 0.010** 
 (0.038) (0.077) (0.050) (0.158) (0.071) (0.034) 
Trade Openness  0.00002 0.002 0.001 0.004* 0.001 0.004* 
 (0.989) (0.235) (0.338) (0.057) (0.409) (0.060) 
Population Growth  -0.400*** -0.401*** -0.368*** -0.378*** -0.351*** -0.448*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Primary School Enrolment  -0.004 -0.007 -0.010** -0.011* -0.008 -0.005 
 (0.465) (0.112) (0.031) (0.077) (0.125) (0.432) 
       
Long Term Effects  na na na 7.127 na 4.025 
       
AR(1) (0.287) (0.288) (0.287) (0.286) (0.290) (0.290) 
AR(2) (0.337) (0.336) (0.333) (0.331) (0.338) (0.337) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.719) (0.482) (0.485) (0.789) (0.451) (0.801) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.701) (0.773) (0.717) (0.869) (0.700) (0.807) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.589) (0.289) (0.316) (0.579) (0.292) (0.626) 
(b) IV (years, eq (diff))       
H excluding group (0.876) (0.679) (0.577) (0.611) (0.552) (0.574) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.414) (0.293) (0.361) (0.749) (0.340) (0.796) 
Fisher  866.79*** 962.13*** 709.33*** 301.46*** 876.61*** 958.67*** 
Instruments  32 32 32 32 32 32 
Countries  44 44 44 44 44 44 
Observations  371 371 371 371 371 371 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of 
the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. 
 
5. Concluding implications and further research directions 
This study has investigated government quality determinants of ICT adoption using 
Generalised Method of Moments in a sample of 49 Sub Saharan African countries for the 
period 2000-2012. ICT is measured with mobile phone penetration, internet penetration and 
telephone penetration rates while all governance  dimensions from the World Bank 
Governance Indicators are considered, namely: political governance (consisting of political 
stability and “voice & accountability”); economic governance (entailing government 
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effectiveness and regulation  quality) and institutional governance (encompassing the rule of 
law and corruption-control). The following findings have been established. First, political 
stability and the rule of law have positive short run and negative long term effects on mobile 
phone penetration. Second, the rule of law has a positive (negative) short run (long term) 
effect on internet penetration.  
Third, government effectiveness and corruption-control have positive short run and 
long term effects on telephone penetration.  The positive effect of government effectiveness is 
broadly consistent with Oluwatobi et al. (2015) who have concluded that economic 
governance is the most significant driver of innovation in Africa. The relevance of corruption-
control also in a broad sense, accords with recent African institutional literature which has 
concluded that corruption-control is the best governance tool in the fight against software 
piracy (Andrés & Asongu, 2013) and conflicts/crimes (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2016).  
The relevant policy concern that arises from the findings is how the rule of law can be 
leveraged to stimulate both mobile phone and internet penetrations in the long term. It is 
important to note that, like the rule of law, corruption-control (that positively affects 
telephone penetration both the short and long terms) is also an aspect of institutional quality. 
It follows that, of the engaged governance dynamics, institutional governance appears to be 
the most significant in determining ICT adoption in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In other 
words, the respect by the State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between 
them is critical to boosting ICT adoption in the sub-region. This would potentially contribute 
to significantly addressing SSA’s extreme poverty tragedy.   
The main contribution of the study to the extant literature is that it has steered clear of 
the ICT-governance literature which has fundamentally focused on the effect of ICT on 
governance. We have investigated the opposite relationship. Moreover, we have not been 
limited to country-specific cases on the one hand and a few governance and ICT variables on 
the other hand (Snow, 2009; Mathias, 2012; Porter et al., 2015; Gagliardone, 2016). 
Accordingly, we have used three ICT variables and all six government quality variables from 
World Governance Indicators of the World Bank. 
 Future studies can improve the existing literature by investigating the long and short 
effects of ICT on inclusive human development in SSA. This recommendation is relevant to 
policy in the light of the post-2015 sustainable development agenda because growth in SSA 
has not been inclusive. In essence, despite the sub-region enjoying more than two decades of 
growth resurgence, it has been experiencing increasing extreme poverty.  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Definitions and sources of variables  
    
Variables  Signs  Definitions  Sources 
    
Mobile Phone  Mobile  Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI 
    
Internet   Internet  Internet  subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI 
    
Telephone   Telephone Telephone  subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI 
    
 
 
Political 
Stability  
 
 
PolS 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized 
or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent means, including 
domestic violence and terrorism”. 
 
WGI 
    
 
Voice & 
Accountability  
 
VA 
“Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to which a 
country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government 
and to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom of association and a 
free media” 
 
WGI 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness  
 
 
GE 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality of public 
services, the quality and degree of independence from political 
pressures of the civil service, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of governments’ commitments to 
such policies”. 
 
 
WGI 
    
 
Regulation 
Quality 
 
RQ 
“Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development”. 
 
WGI 
    
 
Corruption-
Control 
 
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent 
to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state 
by elites and private interests” 
 
WGI 
    
 
 
Rule of Law  
 
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” 
 
 
 
WGI 
    
GDP growth  GDPg GDP growth rate WDI 
    
Trade Openness   Trade Import plus Exports of Goods and Services (%  of GDP) WDI 
    
Population 
growth 
Population  Total Population Growth (annual %) WDI 
    
Education  PSE Primary School Enrolment (% of Gross) WDI 
    
WGI: World Governance Indicators.  WDI: World Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics 
      
 Mean  SD Min Max Obs 
Mobile Phone Penetration  23.379 28.004 0.000 147.202 572 
Internet Penetration  4.152 6.450 0.005 43.605 566 
Telephone Penetration  3.039 5.810 0.005 32.455 565 
Political Stability  -0.543 0.956 -3.323 1.192 578 
Voice & Accountability  -0.646 0.737 -2.233 0.990 578 
Government Effectiveness  -0.771 0.620 -2.450 0.934 577 
Regulation Quality -0.715 0.644 -2.665 0.983 578 
Corruption-Control -0.642 0.591 -1.924 1.249 579 
Rule of Law  -0.741 0.662 -2.668 1.056 578 
GDP growth  4.714 6.322 -47.552 63.379 608 
Trade Openness  78.177 36.138 20.964 209.874 597 
Population Growth  2.361 0.948 -1.081 6.576 588 
Education  97.446 25.895 32.199 181.700 470 
      
SD: Standard deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations. Adj: Adjusted.  
 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation Matrix (Uniform sample size: 407) 
              
                           Governance Variables                Control Variables  Dependent Variables   
PolS VA GE RQ CC RL GDPg Trade Popg PSE Mobile Internet Telephone  
1.000 0.636 0.605 0.538 0.614 0.767 -0.084 0.253 -0.271 0.255 0.298 0.312 0.470 PolS 
 1.000 0.740 0.727 0.612 0.787 0.018 0.014 -0.250 0.248 0.274 0.325 0.459 VA 
  1.000 0.845 0.979 0.874 0.030 0.021 -0.335 0.212 0.293 0.320 0.504 GE 
   1.000 0.649 0.772 -0.025 -0.002 -0.247 0.217 0.264 0.176 0.286 RQ 
    1.000 0.817 -0.090 -0.014 -0.309 0.118 0.273 0.342 0.565 CC 
     1.000 -0.044 0.109 -0.286 0.219 0.274 0.332 0.530 RL 
      1.000 0.029 0.157 0.083 -0.043 -0.002 -0.052 GDPg 
       1.000 -0.380 0.167 0.259 0.158 0.228 Trade 
        1.000 -0.172 -0.331 -0.414- -0.581 Popg 
         1.000 0.288 0.224 0.181 PSE 
          1.000 0.690 0.479 Mobile 
           1.000 0.695 Internet  
            1.000 Telephone  
              
PolS: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation Quality. CC: Corruption-Control. 
RL: Rule of Law.  GDPg : GDP per capita growth rate. Popg: Population growth. PSE: Primary School Enrolment. Mobile: Mobile Phone 
Penetration. Internet: Internet Penetration. Telephone: Telephone Penetration. 
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